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cuss the major policy failures that have led to the ruinous situation 
of the underclass today. 
THE NEW FREEDOM: INDIVIDUALISM AND COL-
LECTIVISM IN THE SOCIAL LIVES OF AMERICANS. 
By William A. Donohue.t New Brunswick: Transaction Pub-
lishers. 1990. Pp. 250. Cloth, $29.95. 
Edward J. Erler 2 
The motto of the Invincible Order of Assassins, an eleventh 
century Islamic sect described by Nietzsche as "that order of free 
spirits par excellence," was: "Nothing is true, everything is permit-
ted. "3 According to Professor William Donohue, this has become 
the effective motto of "the ascendant idea" of contemporary Ameri-
can morality. His studied conclusion: "Something has gone 
wrong." Indeed! 
For a sociologist Professor Donohue is unusually insightful in 
his analysis of the root causes of the "new freedom" that he de-
plores. But his account of the new American morality is more than 
insightful: it is written with a verve that is altogether rare in aca-
demic works. It is also infused with something that is even rarer in 
academia-a genuine moral outrage about the condition of Ameri-
can society. In fact the book as a whole might be characterized as a 
refreshingly honest (and sustained) cri de coeur, culminating in a 
lament that the new freedom has destroyed our capacity for moral 
outrage. But as Donohue rightly points out, the capacity to feel and 
express moral outrage inspired by what James Madison called "a 
consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes"4 is the necessary 
cement of any civilized society. The new freedom has simply pro-
vided the solvent that will dissolve the moral connections that form 
the basis of every decent society. Yet it is precisely this spiritedness 
or thumos which leads men to sustain and protect the values of the 
community that ideological liberalism-the source of the new mo-
rality-views as the greatest obstacle to progress. 
The revolution that produced the new morality, according to 
I. Adjunct Scholar, Heritage Foundation. 
2. Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, California State University, 
San Bernardino. 
3. Friedrich Nietzsche, 3 Genealogy of Morals sec. 24 (tr. Walter Kaufman and R.J. 
Hollingdale, Vintage Books, 1967). 
4. Federalist 10 (Madison) in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist 56, 64 (Wesleyan U. 
Press, 1961 ). 
1991] BOOK REVIEWS 527 
Donohue, is unique: "Previous revolutions have been motivated out 
of despair against poverty, misery, and injustice. This revolution is 
different: it is motivated out of despair against the limitations of the 
human condition. It is the ultimate revolution." It is, in fact, a 
revolt against the limits of human nature. The watchword of the 
"new" revolution is "liberation"-liberation against all restraints, 
natural or conventional. But as Donohue cogently notes, "man is 
essentially going to war against himself. It is a war he cannot hope 
to win." 
None ofthis is exactly a mystery. The whole course of modern 
science and philosophy has been the progressive denial of either nat-
ural or divine limits to the human condition. What we are witness-
ing today in liberation ethics and liberation theology is the 
beginning of the end of the modern project. "What makes the new 
freedom so unique," Donohue writes, "is its insistence that every 
individual has a right to be totally liberated from everything that 
constrains him." Donohue traces the powerful impact of this ethos 
on various aspects of American society: the family, schools, reli-
gion, law, sexuality, children's rights, and so on. As readers of this 
journal know, all of these topics have constitutional dimensions. If 
the work seems too ambitious, Donohue cogently sticks to the nar-
row theme of the "new freedom" and its influence in shaping the 
various relations of society. He is a shrewd observer and a trench-
ant critic; his critics no doubt will accuse him of indulging in "pop" 
sociology-but if so, Donohue will simply have proven that this is 
sociology at its best. 
The revolt against nature is, of course, the defining characteris-
tic of all "liberation" movements. Donohue quotes radical feminist 
Shulamith Firestone's diatribe against the two strongest forces con-
spiring to oppress women: convention and nature. "Feminists have 
to question, not just all of Western culture, but the organization of 
culture itself, and further, even the very organization of nature." 
Donohue laconically comments that "[t]here is no better descrip-
tion of what the new freedom is all about than this." 
The bulk of Donohue's critique of the "new freedom" is di-
rected against what he sees as the development of radical individu-
alism. Radical individualism manifested as a kind of moral 
autonomy stands in contrast to the "authority, tradition, and cus-
tom" that are the essential ingredients of every civilized society. As 
Donohue notes, the "belief in a society of total, uninhibited expres-
sions of individuality is a contradiction in terms; society demands at 
least some subordination of the individual to the social." In the 
quest for individual autonomy there is no regard for the public 
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good, those things-principles, values and traditions-that define 
the community itself. 
"The new freedom," Donohue laments, "tolerates no abridg-
ments of liberty and regards appeals to the common good as uncon-
scionable infringements on the rights of the individual. •• Donohue 
maintains that liberalism once inculcated a strong sense of responsi-
bility as the necessary counterpart to rights. The idea of responsi-
bility has, however, been entirely lost in what Donohue calls the 
"rights mania" shuffle. Responsibility was once part of the idea of 
self-interest rightly understood, a recognition that one's individual 
interest was intimately connected to the interest of society as a 
whole. This sense of responsibility-however minimal it might 
have been-has been virtually extinguished in the most self-serving 
pursuit of private interest. And this private interest is only thinly 
disguised as the pursuit of rights. "The single-minded pursuit of 
rights," Donohue observes, "has jettisoned an interest in serving the 
common good .... We have come to think of rights as nothing more 
than a weapon of self-interest." 
It is certainly true that the tension between individual rights 
and the public good is most evident in liberal democracies. The 
emphasis on private rights does tend to make the citizens of liberal 
democracies self-centered. Thus the existence of the common good 
will always be in some sense problematic. Yet, as Donohue clearly 
points out, the public good does not exist at the expense of private 
rights, nor does the existence of private rights render the existence 
of the public interest impossible. It was Marx who, most notably in 
On the Jewish Question, argued for the abolition of rights in the 
name of community. The existence of liberty in the form of rights 
translated the individual into an "isolated nomad"-a "circum-
scribed individual"-incapable of community life.s But as Dono-
hue makes quite clear, there is no necessity of choosing between the 
extremes of communism and radical individualism. Indeed, Dono-
hue rightly maintains that private rights flourish when citizens 
share a well-defined sense of public purpose and public-spiritedness. 
For it is in the presence of the common good that the ideas of rights 
and responsibilities go hand in hand. In simple terms, no one's 
rights are secure unless the rights of all are secure. The obligation 
to secure one's own rights therefore simultaneously imposes the ob-
ligation to secure the rights of all. This is the necessary but not 
sufficient condition of the common good in liberal democracies. 
Donohue is not the first nor the most incisive critic of the con-
5. Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels 
Reader 26, 42 (W.W. Norton, 2d ed., 1978). 
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temporary "rights industry." But he does succeed admirably in 
clarifying its relationship to his principal thesis. In the rights mania 
that obviously exists today, no one speaks for the common good or 
the public interest. Rights are seen as simply private interests or 
claims without the necessity of responsibility. The ethos of the new 
freedom is liberation without responsibility. Civil rights groups 
have simply become private interest groups engaged in lobbying for 
special privileges or exemptions which they deign to call "civil 
rights." As Donohue shows, the civil rights industry indulges a 
conception of rights without responsibility, a conception that en-
dangers the existence of civil rights because at bottom it translates 
rights into nothing more than self-interested claims. 
One legal writer has described this new conception of rights 
with unabashed clarity: rights are claims "made by or on behalf of 
an individual or group of individuals to some condition or power."6 
Rights are thus merely positive claims to entitlements or positions 
of power. And there are no limits either to what can be claimed as 
a right or as to what might be claimed as its source. As this same 
writer notes, "the right may be a 'liberty,' 'prerogative,' 'privilege,' 
'power,' 'exemption,' or 'immunity,' [and] may have its source in 
law or morals or custom; it may be comparative or noncomparative; 
it may consist of a principle or a policy; it may be absolute or defea-
sible."7 It is no longer possible to speak of the rights of citizens; one 
must instead speak of the rights of gays, blacks, Hispanics, women, 
ad infinitum. 
But while the rhetoric of rights is still intact it is clear that the 
special pleadings of these various groups no longer have anything to 
do with rights properly understood. In the end, the concept of 
rights as claims to privileges or entitlements is governed only by the 
interest of the stronger, where there are only claims of preferment 
but none of justice. Justice is the provenance of the commonweal-
rights understood as merely claims or privileges are the dissolution 
of the commonweal and therefore the dissolution of justice. In the 
Federalist, Madison spoke of the new society envisioned by the 
Constitution as one animated by "principles ... of justice and the 
general good."s Justice--as opposed to the interest of the 
stronger-is intimately connected to the general good. It is the ar-
chitectonic principle which defines the idea of rights. To claim a 
right is simultaneously to accept the responsibilities of the common 
interest of society. Otherwise, the exercise of rights will be as non-
6. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 540 (1982). 
7. Id. at 540-41 (footnotes omitted). 
8. Federalist 51 (Madison) in Cooke, ed., The Federalist at 347, 353 (cited in note 4). 
530 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 8:526 
existent in civil society as they are in the state of nature. Madison 
cogently remarked that: 
[J]ustice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. 
It ever has been, and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained, or 
until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms 
of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the 
weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign, as in a state of 
nature where the weaker individual is not secured against the 
violence of the stronger.9 
But justice can never be simply the sum of the various claims 
to preference made on behalf of the various groups in society. The 
claims themselves must be moderated by a sense of the public 
good-at a minimum, the claims must be informed by a concept of 
self-interest rightly understood. But the rights mania that prevails 
today has no regard for the community. Madison taught us that 
justice is the necessary ingredient of liberal democracy; without it 
there is no hope of avoiding majority faction. Donohue reminds us 
in a very timely and useful fashion of the importance of Madison's 
lesson. We may blithely go about our business of extending rights, 
only to find that in the end we have become the slaves of our own 
passions. No self-governing and free people can be ruled by "the 
tyranny of their own passions."to It almost goes without saying 
that the morality of today's new freedom has nothing to do with 
self-government. Liberation is the submission to tyranny under the 
guise of freedom. Donohue sees this clearly. His insight is all too 
rare-among academics it is virtually non-existent. 
THE HOLLOW MEN: POLffiCS AND CORRUPTION 
IN HIGHER EDUCATION. By Charles J. Sykes. 1 Wash-
ington, D. C: Regnery Gateway. 1991. Pp. xii, 356. Cloth 
$19.95. 
Maurice J. Holland 2 
Although its author mercifully refrains from quoting those 
overused lines of Yeats, this book brings to mind the ones about the 
9. Id. at 352. 
10. Federalist 63 (Madison) in Cooke, ed., The Federalist at 422, 425 (cited in note 4). 
I. Freelance writer, formerly a reporter for The Milwaukee Journal and formerly edi-
tor of Milwaukee Magazine. 
2. Dean, School of Law, University of Oregon. 
